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An objective assessment of the economic
implications of the strategy
informed by three years of operation
AGENDA: TONIGHT
The New Zealand primary health care strategy
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institutional changes
Research methodology
economics of contracts
Economics of health care markets
demand for health care
risk management and insurance markets
contractual responses – international experience
Application to the NZ strategy
AGENDA: THURSDAY
The NZ primary health care strategy
focus on institutional changes
Competition: theories and implications
Governance: theories and implications
Application to the NZ strategy
Conclusions
implications for the future
alternative models
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Social contract
between government and taxpayers
tax-payer-funded welfare benefit
paid per unit of service consumed
universal (1938-1991) then targeted (1991-2002) based upon
financial and health need characteristics
Service delivery via public-private partnership
between government and service delivers
contracts with alternative providers (post 1994)

THE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE STRATEGY 2001
Perceptions:
financial and service-related barriers for specific populations
variations in health states between different groups
A desire to increase:
the proportion of government funding in primary care
the range of service types available to patients
co-ordination of patient care amongst a range of providers
information quantity and quality
service innovation
INSTRUMENTS OF THE STRATEGY
Institutional instrument: PHOs
nonprofit entities
geographically based – community focus, linked to DHBs
co-ordinating contracts for service provision with providers on
behalf of registered population
mixed governance – providers, community
Financial instruments
capitation funding
differential funding based upon registered PHO population
characteristics (age, ethnicity, financial deprivation)
progressive increases in government capitation funding over
time (age-related)

KEY FEATURES
PHOs as ‘other party’ to social contract
central entity
change in allocation of property rights to government funding
Change in the basis of government funding
focus on rewarding registration activities
Freedom for PHOs to enter into contracts with
service providers
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Contracts are pivotal
delivering objectives and aspirations
delivering ‘value for money’
PHOs pivotal contracting entities
PHO contracts examined
funding contracts (tonight)
governance contracts
interaction between PHOs and other sector entities
(competition)
CONTRACTS, INSTITUTIONS AND
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Economic contracts
agreement with obligations
specify terms of relationships (e.g. governance)
Contracting process
search, negotiation, terms, monitoring and enforcing
performance
 a competition processes
Efficient contracts
minimise transaction costs
limit opportunistic behaviour
allocate risk
facilitate investment in specific assets
allocate property rights
CONTRACTS IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS
Different characteristics from other product
Information asymmetries
service deliverer knows more than patient
Service
consumption good
once consumed cannot refund
difficulties in ascertaining quality
Derived demand
DERIVED DEMAND
Unpredictability of falling ill => demand uncertainty
uncertainty for consumer – how much to save
uncertainty for service providers – how much to invest to meet
uncertain demand
‘Solution’ to uncertainty = insurance instruments
large numbers – pooling reduces costs of demand uncertainty
consumers – premium paid regularly when well to ascertain
access to funds for treatment when ill
providers – likelihood of payment when patient seeks treatment
INSURANCE AND HEALTH SYSTEM DESIGN
Separation of service delivery and funding/purchasing
Two products/markets to consider:
financial risk management (insurance products)
health service delivery
Insurance entity enters into two types of contract:
receives premiums/taxes from patients/taxpayers (funding)
contracts service deliverers to treat patients when they are ill
(purchasing)
Patient/Consumer enters into two types of contract:
with insurer to manage costs/risks of falling ill
with service provider to deliver services when ill
DIFFICULTIES WITH INSURANCE SYSTEMS
‘Moral hazard costs (individuals and providers)
Inefficient over-consumption as patient does not pay full costs
of treatment
patient-induced (worried well)
supplier-induced (over-treatment, most profitable, etc.)
mitigated by sharing risks/costs of over-consumption
patient co-payments
supplier incentive contracts
Adverse selection costs (individuals and insurers)
high cost/low cost pools (profitability consequences)
correlated demands
screening and signaling
mitigated by individual risk-rating, large numbers, reinsurance,
non-exclusion provisions etc.
HEALTH SYSTEM DESIGN CHALLENGE
To constrain moral hazard and adverse selection costs given the
existence of insurance markets is inevitable if health sectors
are to function efficiently
Constraining moral hazard:
sharing risks with patients
sharing risks with providers
Tension:
sharing risks with providers exposes providers to risks of
variation in patient demand
providers now become insurers – must manage for random,
correlated risks
how much risk to share with providers and how to share it?
CONTRACTUAL OPTIONS
Fee for service
insurer bears all risks (cost and demand variation)
Price/volume contracts
provider bears risks of own cost variations
Full capitation
provider bears all risks (cost and demand variation)
Partial capitation
cost and demand variations shared
but how to design optimal contract?
PARTIAL CAPITATION CONTRACTS
Insurer pays both capitation and fee for service
components
information to balance risks/design efficient contract
Split between insurer and patient
information for efficient contract design lost
incentive effects on providers lost (recoup costs from patients)
distinction between capitation (premium) and fee for service
(premium top-up) components
premiums paid for all insured, only those seeking treatment pay
top-up
sicker patients consume more care, pay more premium top-ups
effect is a perfectly risk-rated system – those who cause more
costs (consume more care) pay more top-ups – equity issues
MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Increases in premium subsidies (decreases in
patient payments) increases moral hazard costs
Sharing patient risks with providers increases
likelihood of adverse selection occurring
Only those patients consuming care pay increased
risk costs
patients of high-risk providers will pay higher costs than those
of low-risk providers (or low-risk providers can charge same
prices as high-risk and keep profits)
higher-than-average consumers (I.e. sicker) pay more of the
risk costs than lower-than-average
RISK BEARING AND THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM
Fee for service
Central risk pool (4 million)
‘Welfare benefit’ to pay part of fee, patient pays rest
Self-insurance for all others (paying only own costs)
No scope for adverse selection
Constraints on patient moral hazard
Extent of provider moral hazard?
RISK-BEARING UNDER THE NEW STRATEGY
Government bears no patient demand variation
fixed fee – only variation is number of citizens
77 PHOs are now insurance companies
bear all risks associated with patient demand variation
geographical implications of correlated demand
freedom to contract (can pass risks via contracts to service
providers, who can recoup costs from patients via patient
payments)
absence of prudential monitoring of PHOs as insurance
companies
questions about availability of information to monitor/ manage
population risks (US comparisons)
CONTRACTING BEHAVIOURS
PHOs are passing capitation payments in total on
to service providers
very small risk pools (1200-2000)
absence of risk reserves and strong reinsurance markets
strong incentives for adverse selection (especially for higher-
subsidised groups) and other risk management practices
(e.g.screening)
Strong suggestions of higher risk costs already
variations in patient prices reflect different risk-bearing abilities
higher-subsidised practices have greater risk reserves
higher-risk practices passing costs onto patients
co-payments falling less than average subsidy increases
Care Plus as a response to higher-than-anticipated costs
IMPLICATIONS
Providers’ ‘get out of risk-bearing for free’ card
raises questions about reason for capitation
Patient co-payments
provider recovers costs by charging difference between
capitation and costs to patients
no additional incentive to manage moral hazard
no additional incentive to innovate
but all the additional overheads of adverse selection,
administration, regulation, quality control …..
Higher costs in total
higher gains required from other elements of the strategy
INFORMATION ISSUES
Prices no longer reflect cost of service delivery
Capitation setter cannot design optimal contract
Individual (sick) patients become ‘risk-bearers of
last resort’
least able to bear risk
entered into insurance arrangement to avoid this
Effect = perfectly risk-rated insurance premium
paid by patient
(or a tax on falling sick)
implications for health states
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Competitive markets – United States managed care
competition for insurance product
Full funding – England’s NHS
A CHALLENGE FOR NEW ZEALAND
